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BARGAINING POWER AND UNCONSCIONABILITY:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO UCC SECTION 2-302
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a court
may refuse to enforce a contract, or any clause thereof, which it finds to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made.- The section is new
to the law of sales,2 and neither the Code nor the common law provides an
established definition of unconscionability.3 Nonetheless, analysis of the
section's purpose, as expressed in the Comment thereto, indicates that there
are definite and reasonable limits to the intended scope of the section's
application. The Official Comment states that the section is intended to
prevent "oppression and unfair surprise," 4 two rather common abuses of
bargaining power by the stronger party to a contract.5
1 If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
UNIFORM COMM cI LcI CODE § 2-302(1). As to the meaning and significance of § 2-302,
see generally Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843 (1960); Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 401
(1961); Note, 45 VA. L. Rxv. 583 (1959); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954); 58 DIcK.
L. REv. 161 (1954) ; Comment, 18 U. Cur. L. REv. 146 (1950). See also 1 HAwK-
LAND, A TRANSAcrioNAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 44-48 (1964).
2 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
a Note, 45 IowA L. REV. 843, 847, 850 (1960). The notion of unconscionability,
to be sure, has antecedents in the law. Courts have often refused to enforce contracts
which appear to be grossly unfair, but they have done this by manipulating doctrines
of assent and consideration and techniques of construction to attain the desired result
of nonenforcement. Indeed, one of the avowed purposes of the section is to provide
courts with a means of achieving the same results in such cases without having to
resort to such manipulation, which often distorts the growth of contract concepts.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. Similarly, while equity courts have
often refused to grant specific performance where the result would be unconscionable,
Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 406 (1961), such cases do not provide an established
definition.
In Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889), the Supreme Court defined
an unconscionable contract as one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other . . . ." This definition, however, has not been considered to be of much help
in providing a workable test under § 2-302.
This lack of definition in the section has led some commentators to suggest that
the section gives courts too much power to alter private agreements, and that it poses
a threat to commercial stability. E.g., King, Suggested Changes in The Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L. REv. 113, 115 (1954). For these reasons Cali-
fornia, when it enacted the Code, refused to adopt §2-302.' California State Bar
Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALIF. ST.
B.J. 119, 136 (1962).
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
The Comment states that the section's purpose is not to disturb "the allocation
of risks due to superior bargaining power." Ibid. As demonstrated in the text
accompanying notes 6-8 infra, this statement, if taken literally, somewhat contradicts
the purpose of preventing oppression. See 79 H~av. L. Rv. 1299, 1301 (1966). The
real force of the statement, it would seem, is cautionary: a contract is not necessarily




The relation of the first of these abuses, oppression, to disparate bar-
gaining power is obvious. An oppressive contract is one in which party A
forces party B to accept burdensome terms, not justified by commercial
necessities, as the cost of obtaining the contract's benefits. B accepts the
oppressive terms, although aware of the consequences, because his bar-
gaining power is such that he must do business on A's terms or not at all.
The other evil at which the section is aimed, unfair surprise, is also
related to the relative bargaining positions of the parties.0 Unfair surprise
is most easily illustrated by the fine print contract. In many modem com-
mercial agreements, the document containing the basic agreement of the
parties also contains a myriad of fine print terms explaining and qualifying
the parties' rights and obligations. In many such situations it is likely that
the party to whom the contract is offered does not read the fine print; and
if he attempts to read it he may find it written in highly technical legal
language which is either misleading or altogether incomprehensible.7
When the party learns, subsequent to his agreeing to the contract, that the
fine print contains a provision which he had not known was in the contract,
he is surprised within the meaning of the Comment to section 2-302. If
he should reasonably have known and understood the relevant terms, then
the surprise is not "unfair." But when his ignorance is reasonable, and
the other party knew or should have known at the time the contract was
made that such ignorance was likely, then the surprise is unfair.8 Thus
it appears that a party who is able to include in the contract terms not
likely to be read or understood occupies a superior bargaining position
which can yield advantages as unjustifiable as those obtainable by a party
with a superior economic position.
This analysis indicates that the Official Comment gives more guidance
to the interpretation of section 2-302 than has been thought.9 Its applica-
tion is to be limited to those contracts whose unfairness arises from un-
equal bargaining power between the parties. The two aspects of uncon-
scionability identified by the Official Comment to section 2-302 thus share
a common characteristic: they both are related to inequality of bargaining
power between the parties. It might therefore be suggested, on the basis
of the Official Comment, that the section is not intended to apply to all
contracts which are "unfair," but only to those contracts in which unfair-
ness can be said to have resulted from inequality of bargaining power
between the parties.
Two recent cases seem to have employed this analysis in construing
the concept of unconscionability embodied in section 2-302. In Henningsen
GThis relationship has generally been overlooked. See, e.g., 79 HARV. L. REv.
1299, 1301 (1966).
7 See, for example, the ingeniously shrunken fine print on the back of a standard
bill of lading.
8 Traditionally, under the doctrine of objective intent, unfair surprise was irrele-
vant. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, ConTRAcTS § 70 (1932) ; Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 494,
495 (1950).
9 See, e.g., Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 401, 403-04 (1961).
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v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'0 an automobile owner and his wife sued the
manufacturer and the dealer for personal injuries suffered in an accident
caused by a defect in the automobile's steering mechanism. The defense
was based in part on a provision in the contract of sale limiting liability
for breach of warranty to the replacement of defective parts. The court
held that the provision was void as against public policy, and granted re-
covery. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on two facts. The
first was that the type of disclaimer used by the defendant Chrysler Cor-
poration was used by all automobile manufacturers, so that even if plain-
tiff had actually known its effect he would have had to accept it or forego
the purchase of an automobile." The second fact was that the purchaser
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the disclaimer of
liability-for the clause, hidden in fine print, was not pointed out to plain-
tiff by the dealer at the time of the purchase, and even if it had been its
language was such that a reasonable layman might not have understood
its legal effect.' 2 Although the Code was not in effect in New Jersey when
this case was decided, the court's citation of section 2-302 suggests that the
case presented the types of abuses which that section was intended to
prevent.
13
The notion of surprise appears, in even more striking fashion, in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.'- In that case defendant Wil-
liams purchased a 514 dollar stereo set from plaintiff on an installment con-
tract which provided that the amount owed on the contract would be added
on to any amount already owed by defendant, so that payments made were
credited proportionately to all outstanding debts. The effect of the contract
was, on one hand, to prevent the balance due on the first purchase from
being satisfied until the amount due on all items was satisfied, and, on the
other hand, to secure the debt incurred on the last item purchased by all
items previously purchased. Prior to the transaction in question the pur-
chaser had, since 1957, made purchases totalling approximately 1300
dollars, of which she had paid all but 164 dollars. Shortly after purchasing
the stereo set she defaulted on her payments and plaintiff moved to replevy
all items purchased since 1957. The lower court denied defendant's con-
tention that the add-on provision was unconscionable, on the ground that
the District of Columbia did not recognize a doctrine of unconscionability.35
10 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11 Id. at 389-91, 161 A.2d at 86-87.
12 1d. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93. For a much-cited discussion of judicial treatment
of fine print clauses prior to the enactment of the Code, see Note, 63 H~Auv. L. REV.
494 (1950).
1 358 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. As one commentator has suggested, the
Henningsen holding-that the clause violated public policy-rests on narrower grounds
than those provided by § 2-302 which may be applied to contracts whose abuses may
not be so egregious as to invoke the condemnation of public policy. Posel, Sales and
Sales Financing, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 329, 335-36 (1962).
14 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 54 GEo. L.J. 703 (1966); 79 HAMv. L. REV.
1299 (1966); 12 How. L.J. 164 (1966).
15 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
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The court of appeals reversed and remanded for findings of fact as to
whether the contract was unconscionable. The court held that Congress'
action in adopting the Uniform Commercial Code and section 2-302 for the
District of Columbia, although taken subsequent to the contract in question
so that 2-302 was not directly applicable, gave the court authority to recog-
nize as part of the jurisdiction's common law the doctrine of uncon-
scionability.
One of the factors which the court deemed important was defendant's
"obvious lack of education" and her consequent inability to understand the
terms of the contract.16 Even though there was no indication that plaintiff
had made a deliberate attempt to "hide" the add-on provision, as had been
done with the disclaimer clause in Henningsen, Mrs. Williams was sur-
prised because her "obvious lack of education" made her unable to under-
stand the terms of the contract. This surprise was unfair because the
seller, who knew or should have known that Mrs. Williams did not under-
stand the contract, seemingly made no attempt to explain its terms to her.
Both Henningsen and Williams thus represent situations in which a
court, using the type of analysis obviously intended under section 2-302,
refused to allow a party with superior bargaining power the benefits of
unfair contractual advantages achieved by means of its superiority. That
inequality of bargaining power should be a sine qua non to a finding of
unconscionability may be seen by an analysis of the relation between sec-
tion 2-302 and the doctrine of freedom of contract. The freedom of con-
tract doctrine rests on the assumption that parties to a contract are the
best judges of the value to themselves of the reciprocal obligations in the
contract.1 7 This assumption is realistic only so long as the contract repre-
sents real bargaining between parties with freedom of choice and conse-
quent ability to negotiate in a meaningful sense. But when one party,
either because of lack of economic power or inability to understand what is
contained in the contract, does not have real bargaining power, the con-
tract's conscionability becomes a matter of grace with the stronger party,
rather than a matter of negotiation. In this case, the assumption that the
parties have really agreed that the reciprocal obligations are adequate is no
longer tenable.' 8 It is at this point that the rationale of section 2-302 be-
comes pertinent. Thus the purpose of the section is not to subvert the
doctrine of freedom of contract but to limit it to situations where the as-
sumption as to reciprocity of benefit is realistic.'9 Where the assumption
16 350 F.2d at 449. The court also noted that defendant had no free choice as
to the terms of the contract, so that plaintiff had the bargaining power to insist on
oppressive terms (or so it could be found on remand).
17 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389-91, 161 A.2d
69, 86-87 (1960), and authorities there cited.
18 Ibid. For a good general discussion of the problems of adhesion contracts see
Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & CoM. L.Q. 172
(1965). For an approach to these problems alternative to that provided in § 2-302,
see Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA.
L. REv. 1178 (1964).
19 See, e.g., Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843-46 (1960).
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is not realistic, where the contract is not the product of a true bargain,
then-and, it is submitted, only then-is a court justified under section
2-302 in examining the terms of the contract to determine whether they
are so unconscionable as to require denial of enforcement.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a court should not consider
the question whether or not a contract is unconscionable, even though it
appears unfair, unless it first determines that at the time the contract was
made there was such an inequality of bargaining power that one party
could include terms in the contract which were not justifiable on grounds
of commercial necessity. This proposition does not mean, however, that
when the bargaining element is lacking a court should then always refuse
to enforce, under 2-302, what appears initially to be an unfair bargain.
This is strikingly illustrated by analysis of two recent cases, In re Dorset
Steel Equip. Co.2 0 and In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co.2 1 Both cases involved
the validity of a security agreement in a bankruptcy proceeding. Since
the relevant facts of the cases were identical, and since they were decided
by the same referee on identical grounds, they will be considered together.
The contract provided that Fidelity America Financial Corporation
(Fidelity) would lend funds to a corporation (debtor), the loans to be
secured, as they were made, by the debtor's accounts receivable. The con-
tract further provided: Fidelity would lend money equal to seventy-five
per cent of the face value of the debtor's accounts receivable deemed ac-
ceptable by Fidelity; although Fidelity had sole discretion to decide which
accounts receivable constituted acceptable collateral, debtor could not
market any of its receivables to any other lender without Fidelity's consent;
debtor could not borrow money from anyone else without Fidelity's con-
sent; debtor had to pay a high interest rate on money borrowed, including
a yearly fixed minimum interest payment unrelated to the amount actually
borrowed; and debtor could not suspend business or go into voluntary
bankruptcy without Fidelity's consent.
When the debtor went into involuntary bankruptcy, Fidelity filed its
claim as a secured creditor. The referee, while acknowledging Fidelity's
claim as a creditor, held that the security provisions enumerated above were
unconscionable and therefore invalid, and that Fidelity had to share in the
assets as an unsecured creditor. He noted that at the time the agreement
was made the debtor was in such a precarious financial situation that no
one except Fidelity would lend it the necessary funds. Consequently, he
inferred that Fidelity had such a superiority in bargaining position that
it was able to dictate the terms on which it would lend money 2 2 Fidelity,
he concluded, used its position to exact concessions which were so onerous
as to be unconscionable, thus rendering the agreement unenforceable in
bankruptcy.
20 2 UCC REP. SERv. 1016 (Bankruptcy No. 26532, E.D. Pa. August Z, 1965).
212 UCC RK,. SERv. 1021 (Bankruptcy No. 26109, E.D. Pa. July 22, 1965).
=2 UCC Ri,. SERv. at 1019-20.
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Even if the referee's two factual assumptions-that the debtor had
virtually no bargaining power and that the terms of the contract taken in
a general business context were so onerous as to be unconscionable-were
accurate, his conclusion seems unjustified. The factor giving rise to the
debtor's lack of bargaining power-a condition precedent to a finding of
unconscionability u-was its precarious financial condition. Yet it is that
very factor which makes the contract at least arguably conscionable. The
limitations on the debtor's power to borrow, the high fixed interest charge
and the other limitations on the debtor's freedom of action may well have
been necessary to protect Fidelity's investment.
A situation analogous to that in the bankruptcy cases can be hypothe-
sized in the Williams case. If Mrs. Williams had been known to treat
her acquisitions poorly-giving them particularly hard wear, neglecting
to repair them or allowing her children to mutilate them-the value of any
particular item purchased might well have depreciated so rapidly that it
would not constitute adequate security for the debt. In this situation the
add-on provision might have been commercially justifiable as a necessary
protection for the furniture company's investment-perhaps, denied this
means of securing the debt, neither Walker-Thomas nor any other furni-
ture company would have been willing to sell Mrs. Williams a stereo set on
time. In this hypothetical case, as in the bankruptcy cases, the very factor
which contributes to one party's lack of bargaining power might justify
contract terms which, in the abstract, appear unconscionable.
Thus it appears that the lack of bargaining power as to a particular
contract may cut two ways with respect to the issue of unconscionability.
The very factors which lead to the lack of bargaining power may serve to
justify the apparently unconscionable terms. Section 2-302(2) provides
a means for a court to take account of this possibility:
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination.4
It would seem, however, that even if such evidence is not presented-as
in the bankruptcy cases L-the court, in determining unconscionability,
should make an effort to judge the contract in its commercial setting. This
is not to say, however, that simply because a particular contract represents
the only terms on which the superior party desires to do business, it is
necessarily commercially justifiable. In the bankruptcy cases, for example,
even though Fidelity might have needed more than ordinary control over
23 See pp. 999, 1001-02 supra.
24 UN oRi CommRcIAL CODE §2-302(2).
25One factor which may have accounted for the referee's apparent failure to
consider the possible commercial justification for the contracts was that in both cases
Fidelity failed to file a brief. See In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 UCC REP. SERv.
1016, 1017 (Bankruptcy No. 26532, E.D. Pa. August 2, 1965) ; In re Elkins-Dell Mfg.
Co., 2 UCC REP?. SEmv. 1021, 1022 (Bankruptcy No. 26109, E.D. Pa. July 22, 1965).
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the debtor's business as a reasonable protection for its investment, a court
need not conclude that an effort by Fidelity to charge what the traffic would
bear is necessarily justified by its statement that it would have refused to
do business on lesser terms. Sections 1-102(3) 26 and 2-103 27 make clear
that the standard of conduct sanctioned by the Code is that of good faith:
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade." 28
A further question remains concerning the court's power under sec-
tion 2-302. In the hypothetical situation outlined above concerning the
destructive Mrs. Williams,29 assume that the add-on is justifiable in that
particular case as a commercially reasonable way for the seller to protect
himself, although it would be unconscionable in the usual case. Is the
court therefore obligated to enforce the contract even though Mrs. Williams
did not understand its terms? Commentators discussing section 2-302
imply an affirmative answer 3 ° Their argument seems to be that the
section should only be employed where the harshness of the terms cannot
be justified under the circumstances of the particular case. This is not
however a necessary conclusion. Faced with a contract which is apparently
unconscionable, a court might well say that even though its proponent may
be able to justify it because of the unique facts of the particular case, i.e.,
the commercial setting, he cannot prevail unless he can show in addition
that he made the consequences of the contract clear to the other party.
Thus where a contract appears unconscionable, unfair surprise would
justify a court's finding a contract unenforceable even though its provisions
can be justified as commercially reasonable. The justification for such a
view is that even when a person is in such a position that the only way he
can obtain the benefit of a particular transaction is to submit to unusually
harsh terms, he should nonetheless have the choice of deciding whether the
price he must pay is too great. Moreover, it does not seem unjust to
require the proponent of the contract, who presumably knows that the
contract is particularly harsh, to make sure that the other party realizes
the consequences of committing himself to its terms.3
This approach raises still another question: what should be the extent
of the obligation to disclose? In a transaction between businessmen, such
2 6
UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
2 7 UNIFORM COmMECIAL CODE § 2-103(1) (b).
2 Ibid.
29 See p. 1003 supra.
30E.g., Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 494, 504 (1950); 58 DICK. L. REv. 161 (1954).
31 Such an approach to the application of § 2-302 has a particular advantage for
the court. Much comment has centered around the fact that a court may often be
particularly ill-equipped to judge whether or not contracts are justifiable in their
commercial setting. See, e.g., Note, 18 U. Ciai. L. REv. 146, 152 (1950). Yet it does
not seem unlikely to assume that many putatively unconscionable contracts, particularly
in the field of consumer sales, would never be made if the parties both knew and
understood what they were getting into. A rule which would make the failure to
disclose adequately the consequences of a contract to the other party sufficient grounds
to deny enforcement of particularly harsh, albeit justifiable, terms might very well
lead to a situation in which many borderline contracts would not be made at all,
thus relieving the courts of the obligation of wrestling with their justifiability.
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as those in the bankruptcy cases, the proponent's duty might be no more
than to refrain from employing practices designed to hide harsh terms,
on the assumption that all businessmen may reasonably be required to
read straight-forward contracts. 3 2 But the situation is different in the area
of consumer sales. Particularly where the purchaser is uneducated, a
situation most subject to contractual abuse, it is unlikely that anything
but the most central features of the contract are read or understood. If
section 2-302 is to provide adequate protection for these people,a3 the
standard of disclosure imposed on sellers must be higher than in the
transaction between businessmen. However, the greater the duty put on
the seller, the less willing he may be to do business at all. The setting of
the standard must include, therefore, a balancing between the desire for
consumer protection and the desire to provide even the least reasonable
or least educated consumer some opportunity to purchase the commodities
and services which are available to his more fortunate fellow citizens.
While this is a real concern, developing standards of disclosure in various
commercial settings seems no more difficult than other kinds of judicial
balancing, such as establishing standards of care in the tort law.
Thus it would seem desirable for courts to adopt the position that
where the terms of a contract seem particularly harsh, although justifiable
because of the unique fact situation, they will nonetheless be unenforceable
under section 2-302 if the proponent of the contract does not take adequate
steps to disclose the consequences of the harsh terms to the other party.
But if this is a reasonable position the inevitable question arises: what
justification is there for restricting it to contracts whose terms appear un-
conscionable in the abstract? Why should there not be a requirement that
adequate disclosure be made of all terms in all contracts? A short answer
is that where the terms of a contract seem clearly fair it is not "uncon-
scionable" for a court to hold a party to the agreement to which he has
manifested assent. Such an answer to a large extent begs the question by
defining unconscionability in an arbitrary manner. Nonetheless, section
2-302 at this stage of its development is generally considered a limited
remedy for the more intolerable abuses of contract power 3 4 -not a total
reworking of traditional contract doctrine. To urge that the section be
employed to assure that there is subjective assent to a contract, even when
a unique commercial setting is not needed to justify its terms, would seem
to strike too deeply at the firmly established notion that objectively mani-
fested assent is the relevant factor in the formation of contracts.
32 In Dorset Steel the referee noted that the contract involved was written in
fine print and technical language. 2 UCC REP. SEav. at 1020. Such an observation
is not particularly relevant in that case as it seems likely that the principals of Dorset
Steel, even if they could not understand the contract themselves, bad access to a
lawyer who could explain the consequences of the contract to them.
3The area of consumer sales is one in which § 2-302 can be of particular benefit.
For a somewhat horrifying account of the degree to which consumers generally, and
uneducated consumers in particular, are subject to unscrupulous business practices,
with virtually no legal protection, see Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966).
34 See authorities cited note 1 supra.
